Did Trump Signal More Security Cooperation With Pakistan?

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.

The highlights this week: U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation isn’t likely to scale up despite a mention in U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent address, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance will make his second official overseas trip with a visit to India, and Sri Lanka’s president holds a meeting with the International Monetary Fund chief.

U.S.-Pakistan Cooperation?

In his joint address to Congress on March 4, U.S. President Donald Trump took many people by surprise by thanking Pakistan for helping the United States apprehend Mohammad Sharifullah, an Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) militant who is accused of playing a major role in the attack near the Kabul airport in August 2021 that killed approximately 170 Afghan civilians and 13 U.S. soldiers.

Top U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials supplied their Pakistani counterparts with information about Sharifullah’s location, and Pakistani forces tracked him down near the border with Afghanistan. Islamabad extradited him to the United States last week.

In a call with Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and U.S. Central Command thanked Pakistan for its assistance. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif later emphasized Islamabad’s commitment to “partner closely” with Washington on security.

U.S.-Pakistan cooperation to apprehend Sharifullah, as well as an earlier U.S. decision to release nearly $400 million to support maintenance of Pakistan’s F-16 fighter fleet, have raised hopes among Pakistani officials that the Trump administration is prepared to scale up counterterrorism collaboration with the country.

Pakistan has seen spikes in terrorist attacks in recent years, and the scale of this growing threat came into sharp relief on March 11, when the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist group, hijacked a train with more than 400 passengers on board and took many people hostage. Officials said that 33 militants and 21 hostages were killed after a security operation.

A seven-year freeze on most U.S. security assistance to Pakistan and a receding strategic focus on Pakistan since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan have limited possibilities for bilateral cooperation. But in the last few years, Pakistani officials have sought to leverage growing U.S. concerns about IS-K—an Afghanistan-based affiliate with a growing capacity to threaten the United States—to push for more collaboration.

However, it would be premature to view bilateral cooperation on Sharifullah’s capture as a prelude to a new counterterrorism partnership. From Washington’s perspective, deepening U.S. security ties with India and Pakistan’s alliance with China limit possibilities and incentives for cooperation—not to mention that the Trump administration has many harsh Pakistan critics in its ranks.

Though the United States and Pakistan both view IS-K as a threat, they are not aligned on broader threat perceptions. Islamabad’s main concern is not IS-K but the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which operates from Afghanistan and has recently been the most potent terrorist group in Pakistan.

Pakistani forces have carried out cross-border strikes in recent months targeting TTP bases, which have deepened Islamabad’s tensions with the Taliban. The United States would likely have to do a lot to get Pakistan to target IS-K bases, too. (Furthermore, the Taliban—an IS-K rival—has waged offensives against the group within Afghanistan.)

Unlike in the past, the TTP doesn’t currently target or even threaten U.S. citizens or U.S. interests. But if U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation strengthens, becoming more visible, the TTP may start to see the United States as a threat again—a scenario that the Trump administration wants to avoid.

Furthermore, with the United States most concerned about IS-K’s growing threat beyond Afghanistan, the Trump administration may look to partner with countries outside the region to tackle the group’s expanding reach.

There is still some scope for U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation. The two countries worked closely to apprehend al Qaeda terrorists immediately after 9/11. Today, they could leverage a counterterrorism dialogue launched under former U.S. President Joe Biden and pursue intelligence-sharing activities related to IS-K, as well as the TTP and the BLA. (The United States designates all three as terror groups.)

Still, from the Trump administration’s perspective, the most desirable forms of cooperation with Pakistan will likely revolve around the narrow criteria that characterized the Sharifullah operation: cases where the United States receives information about specific Pakistan-based militants who have threatened or targeted U.S. citizens.

What We’re Following

Militants seize train in Pakistan. The BLA’s stunning train seizure on March 11 was unprecedented in Pakistan. Armed militants opened fire on the Peshawar-bound train in the Bolan area of Balochistan province and immediately took hostages. Security forces moved quickly to try to rescue captive passengers, but the train’s location—a mountainous area with limited internet connectivity—made rescue efforts difficult.

Soon after the attack, the BLA demanded that Pakistan release Baloch political prisoners and threatened to harm hostages if Pakistan didn’t do so within 48 hours. However, on March 12, a Pakistani military spokesperson said that security forces had completed a “clearance operation.” Pakistani officials said at least 100 of the passengers were members of the Pakistani security forces—the BLA’s main target.

The attack is a wake-up call for Pakistan, which has focused much of its recent counterterrorism policy debate on the TTP. Meanwhile, the BLA has been ramping up activities, including a suicide attack at a train station in Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan, last November. The group has also staged recent attacks outside of the province, including in Karachi.

The intensification of BLA attacks can be attributed in part to the expansion of large-scale infrastructure projects in Balochistan, many of which are linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As Pakistan increasingly looks to attract foreign investment in its untapped critical mineral reserves, the BLA threat could become even more serious if left unaddressed.

Vance headed to India. Politico reported this week that U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance will travel to India later this month, accompanied by his wife, Usha Vance, who is Indian American. The visit will mark his second trip abroad as vice president. Given the visible role that Vance has played in foreign policy so far, the visit will be closely watched.

It is not clear exactly when Vance will head to India and what is on the agenda, but it will come at a significant moment for U.S.-India trade relations. Last month, following a White House meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump, the two countries pledged to pursue talks on a bilateral trade deal.

However, Trump has warned that India will be hit by his reciprocal tariff policy that is set to take effect on April 2. Due to large tariff differentials, Indian products could be hit hard. Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal recently visited Washington for trade talks while his U.S. counterpart, Howard Lutnick, was in India.

Goyal may return to Washington later this month, and tariffs will likely be a key discussion item for New Delhi during Vance’s visit.

Dissanayake meets IMF chief. Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake met virtually with the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kristalina Georgieva, on March 8. The meeting came as Sri Lanka marked the halfway point of a four-year IMF aid package that it received in March 2023, when the country nearly defaulted.

Dissanayake expressed his appreciation for the IMF package, and Georgieva commended Sri Lanka’s economic recovery and pledged continued support. Dissanayake, a leftist who took office last September, had vowed to renegotiate Sri Lanka’s IMF deal to make it more pro-poor. But this always sounded more like campaign rhetoric than policy intention, given Sri Lanka’s urgent need for assistance.

Dissanayake’s approach appears to be prudent: Sri Lanka’s economy is projected to grow at more than 4 percent this year, compared to negative growth of 7.3 percent during the height of its economic crisis.

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Under the Radar

On March 9, around 10,000 people gathered outside the airport in Kathmandu, Nepal, to cheer on the country’s former king, Gyanendra Shah, as he returned from a trip. A few days earlier, demonstrators at a rally in the capital had called for restoring Nepal’s monarchy, which was abolished in 2008.

Shah was Nepal’s last monarch, and he ruled as an autocrat after taking power in 2001 following the assassination of his brother, King Birendra. Shah hasn’t commented publicly on pro-monarchy protests, and with Nepal’s most powerful political parties staunchly opposed to the monarchy’s return, it’s not likely anything will change.

Still, surging pro-monarchy sentiment in Nepal should be a wake-up call for the political elite. Nepalis were happy to see the end of the monarchy, but many people are now also disillusioned with the corruption and instability that has defined post-monarchy politics, especially amid economic stress.

India’s Hindu nationalist government is likely keeping a close eye on these developments. One of Nepal’s main pro-monarchy parties, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party, wants the country to restore its previous status as a Hindu state. When Nepal ended its monarchy, it became a secular republic.